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WHEN A STUDENT’S SPEECH BELONGS TO THE
UNIVERSITY: KEEFE, HAZELWOOD, AND THE
EXPANDING ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH
DOCTRINE ON CAMPUS
*

Lindsie Trego

INTRODUCTION
Every semester, students of myriad professions are
plagued by the frustration of group projects. Every semester,
students take to social media such as Facebook and Twitter to
complain about group projects. In November, 2012, one
student at Central Lakes College in Minnesota took to
Facebook to complain about his group project woes: “Glad
group projects are group projects. I give her a big fat F for
changing the group power point at eleven lastnight [sic] and
resubmitting. Not enough whiskey to control that anger.” 1
This was not the end of this student’s angsty use of social
media. Nursing student Craig Keefe also posted complaints
about unfair grading, sexism in the nursing program, and his
failed attempts to receive special accommodations for medical
reasons.2
*

J.D. Candidate, Class of 2018, University of North Carolina School of Law; M.A.
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1
Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523, 526–27 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1448
(2017).
2
Id. See also Keefe v. Adams, 44 F. Supp. 3d. 874, 878–80 (D. Minn. 2014), aff’d, 840
F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied., 137 S. Ct. 1448 (2017). Keefe’s other posts
included: “Very interesting. Apparently even if a male student has his Dr. Send
letters to the instructors and director of the nursing program for test taking
considerations they dont get them. But if your a female you can go talk to the
instructors and get a special table in the very back of the class with your back facing
everyone and get to wear ear plugs. And behind me at bat. And you really shouldnt
go around telling everyone that you beat the system and didnt need to follow the
school policy and get a medical diagnosis to get special considerations. I think its just
one more confirmafion of the prejudice in the program. Im taking notes thou....” “So
. . . are you saying that you have never said Laura likes me I will make it, or She will
let me do it for the test. Just wondering why and for what reason you were creeping
on my page. Its really not your fault that the whole sexism thing happens in the
nursing program. But its really bull shit that you say the door distracts you on your
test and there was four other seats in the classroom that was in normal position not
to mention that you choose to sit where you sit. I moved, but not that I still sit like
the rest of the class, and I followed the guidelines of the college and still wasn't able
to do what you did. Which is fine. I am way better than that. I don't need to grasp for
straws. Without your faithful sidekick you aint shit. You tried coming up to me
when your sidekick wasnt there on your clinical and asking me how to give your
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These comments ultimately resulted in Keefe being
administratively removed from his program for exhibiting
“behavior unbecoming of the profession and transgression of
professional boundaries.”3 The District Court for the District of
Minnesota and the Eighth Circuit upheld his suspension. 4
While the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of speech
generally applies to students at public institutions,5 the Eighth
Circuit’s decision in Keefe, as well as similar decisions by other
courts, have carved out an exception: a student may be
academically disciplined for speech that fails to comport with
the professional standards of the student’s chosen profession.6
Since the Supreme Court’s 1969 decision in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District,7 there has been no
question that public students enjoy First Amendment
protection. The Tinker court determined that school officials
may only restrict student expression when there is a reasonable
suspicion that the expression will create a substantial disruption
to the classroom environment or will impede upon the rights of
others. 8 While Tinker considered the rights of a junior high
school student, it has often been applied in the college setting.
Although this decision seemingly made clear the standard for
First Amendment rights for students, the Supreme Court
crafted an exception to the Tinker standard in Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier.9 In Hazelwood, the Court determined that,
solu-medrol WTF read your MAR. How can you give it is the first thing I would
have asked myself, but of course you didnt even know the drug existed. Its a very
common drug. Im going to tell you one more time. Dont come on my page and try
to justify your shit. I was kind enough to not put names in and ID individuals, but
you ID yourself. You creeped my page. Spend your spare time studying, you could
use it. Don't make me go where I don't need to or want to cuz I will. Leave it alone.”
Id.
3
Keefe, 840 F.3d at 527–28.
4
Keefe, 44 F. Supp. at 888–89.
5
See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“The classroom is
peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’ The Nation’s future depends upon leaders
trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers
truth.”); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (“[S]tate colleges and universities
are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First Amendment.”); see also Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (holding that
students enjoy First Amendment speech protections).
6
See, e.g., Keefe, 840 F.3d at 532–33 (holding that schools do not violate the First
Amendment when disciplining professional students for violating their chosen
professions’ codes of conduct); Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850, 861–64 (9th
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2520 (2016) (holding that universities may legally
act against students for their speech when such actions meet a three-part test,
including being related to established professional standards).
7
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
8
Id. at 509.
9
484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
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at least in the K-12 setting, student expression that bears the
imprimatur of the school (such as school newspapers and
school plays) can be regulated for “legitimate pedagogical”
reasons—a much lower standard than that found in Tinker.10
In a footnote, the Hazelwood majority made clear that
they did not consider whether the Hazelwood standard should
apply to the higher education context, as the Hazelwood case
related to K-12 students. 11 While some courts have applied
Hazelwood to school-sponsored college student speech,12 others
have declined to do so. 13 Additionally, the language of
Hazelwood suggests that it is properly applied only in cases
dealing with school-sponsored speech, not in cases of individual
student expression. 14 In crafting an exception to the First
Amendment as it applies to professional students, the Eighth
Circuit and similarly situated courts have erroneously applied
Hazelwood to restrict the individual speech by professional
students, which does not bear the school’s imprimatur. In the
context of recent decisions that expand the reach of the
definition of government speech, such as Walker v. Texas Div.,
Sons of Confederate Veterans,15 the misapplication of Hazelwood in
these cases imagines the government’s imprimatur is affixed to
wide swathes of individual student speech, thereby further
expanding that speech which public schools may more freely
regulate.
This Note examines the recent development of the
professional student speech doctrine as a potential thread of the
general expansion of the government speech doctrine, using the
Eighth Circuit’s recent decision in Keefe v. Adams as a lens for
10

Id.
Id. at 273 n.7.
12
See, e.g., Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1284–85 (10th Cir. 2004); Ward
v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 733 (6th Cir. 2012); Ala. Student Party v. Student Gov’t
Ass’n, 867 F.2d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 1989).
13
Among federal appellate courts, only the First Circuit has expressly rejected the
application of Hazelwood to college student speech. Student Gov’t Ass’n v. Bd. Of
Trs. of the Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473, 480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989). Other courts have
declined to allow administrative regulation of student expression after applying
Hazelwood’s framework, but have not explicitly rejected application of Hazelwood to
college student expression. See McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 247 (3d
Cir. 2010) (finding that Hazelwood’s forum analysis “cannot be taken as gospel” in the
college context).
14
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270–73 (holding that “educators do not offend the First
Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”).
15
135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015) (holding that specialty license plates constitute government
speech and therefore decisions about specialty license plate designs need not be made
in a content-neutral fashion).
11
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this discussion. Analysis follows in five parts: Part I discusses
the Hazelwood line of cases, including a review of seminal
student and university speech cases such as Tinker v. Des Moines
Community School District 16 and Keyishian v. Board of Regents. 17
Part II explores how various courts have approached the
question of First Amendment rights of professional students,
often applying Hazelwood to find that professional students’
speech may be constitutionally regulated. Part III discusses the
facts and background surrounding Keefe specifically. Part IV
discusses the misapplication of Hazelwood and the government
speech doctrine in these cases, as well as potential
consequences of these misapplications. Part V proposes
addressing concerns with professional students’ expression by
means less obstructive to students’ First Amendment rights.
I. HAZELWOOD & STUDENT SPEECH LAW
The Supreme Court has long expressed the importance
of protecting free expression on public college campuses.
Nearly half a century ago in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,18 the
Court announced that, “The classroom is peculiarly the
‘marketplace of ideas.’ The Nation’s future depends upon
leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange
of ideas which discovers truth.” 19 The Court reaffirmed this
sentiment in Healy v. James,20 “not[ing] that state colleges and
universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the
First Amendment.”21
A couple years after its decision in Keyishian, the
Supreme Court clearly established that students enjoy the
protection of the First Amendment while in school.22 In Tinker,
as discussed above, the Supreme Court held that administrators
had violated a junior high school student’s First Amendment
rights when they disciplined her for wearing a black armband in
peaceful protest of the Vietnam War.23 Administrators at public
schools, the Supreme Court said, are state actors, and thus are
barred by the First Amendment from censoring student
expression unless it is likely to pose a substantial disruption to
the classroom environment or infringe upon the rights of other
16

393 U.S. 503 (1969).
385 U.S. 589 (1967).
18
Id.
19
Id. at 603.
20
408 U.S. 169 (1972).
21
Id. at 180.
22
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969).
23
Id.
17
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students.24 While Tinker dealt with the First Amendment rights
of a junior high student, courts have widely applied the
substantial disruption test in postsecondary institutions as
well. 25 Additionally, some federal courts have noted that
student speech jurisprudence such as Tinker is not protective
enough in the college setting, and that college students’ speech
must instead be examined with the same level of protection as
other adults’ expression.26
As noted even in Tinker, though, First Amendment
rights for students are not absolute. 27 This was further
demonstrated in the 1988 Supreme Court ruling in Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier, 28 in which the Court scaled back
First Amendment protection for K-12 student journalists
writing for school-sponsored newspapers by importing the
forum doctrine to the high school student press.29 The forum
doctrine is a complex First Amendment doctrine that holds
certain spaces,” such as sidewalks and parks, to be open to all
protected expression (i.e., “open forums” or “public forums”);
other spaces to be open to only certain kinds of expression or
only expression from certain people (i.e., “designated forums”
or “limited forums”); and a third category of spaces, such as
courtrooms, to be closed to most expression (i.e., “closed
forums”). 30 While usually applied to physical spaces, in
Hazelwood, the Court held that if a school designates a
publication as open for student expression, the publication
becomes an open forum and the Tinker test applies, meaning
censorship is barred unless the expression can reasonably be
expected to substantially disrupt the educational environment.31
However, classroom-based student publications that are a part
of the curriculum are not open forums, and administrators
can “exercis[e] editorial control over the style and content . . .
so long as [administrators’] actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”32
This “legitimate pedagogical concerns” test allows
school administrators greater latitude in regulating school24

Id. at 514.
See, e.g., Healy, 408 U.S. at 180; Papish v. Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mont., 410
U.S. 667, 670 (1973); Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc);
McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 249 (3d Cir. 2010).
26
See, e.g., DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 318 (3d Cir. 2008).
27
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503, 509 (holding that student speech may be regulated when it
is likely to cause a substantial disruption to the classroom environment).
28
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
29
Id. at 269–70.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 269.
32
Id. at 273–274 (alteration in original).
25
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sponsored student speech than they were afforded under
Tinker’s more stringent “substantial disruption” standard. 33
While under Tinker administrators were required to show that a
student’s expression was likely to cause a substantial disruption
to the school in order to regulate the expression, under
Hazelwood, an administrator need only demonstrate that
regulation of school-sponsored student speech has an
educational purpose. 34 The Hazelwood case itself offers a
practical example of this difference: The Court appeared to
agree that a student newspaper publishing articles about teen
pregnancy and parental divorce likely would not cause a
disruption on campus.35 However, the Court nonetheless held
that no First Amendment violation had occurred when an
administrator censored those articles because the administrator
had legitimate pedagogical reasons for the regulation, such as
concern for students’ maturity levels.36
Because the Hazelwood Court heavily considered
younger students’ inferior maturity levels in coming to its
decision, 37 and because the decision included a footnote
cautioning that the Court did not decide whether the Hazelwood
test would be appropriate in higher education, 38 early
scholarship did not expect Hazelwood to curb the First
Amendment rights of college students. 39 But in a notable
application of Hazelwood to the college setting, the Seventh
Circuit held that if a college-sponsored publication is not
designated as a public forum, a college is also permitted to
restrict the publication for legitimate pedagogical reasons. 40
Under Hosty v. Carter,41 colleges can discipline collegiate media
that are not designated as public forums—such as by means of
removing editors, defunding the publication, or instituting other
forms
of
restrictions—for
practicing
pedagogically
inappropriate reporting.42 On the other hand, some courts have
33

Id. at 272–73.
Id. at 271–73.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 272.
38
Id. at 273 n.7.
39
See, e.g., J. Marc Abrams & S. Mark Goodman, End of an Era? The Decline of Student
Press Rights in the Wake of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 1988 DUKE L.J.
706, 707 (1988) (stating that collegiate media, unlike high school press, would “retain
the vitality derived from the history of student press litigation in the past twenty
years”).
40
See Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 734–36 (7th Cir. 2005) (superseded in statute as
stated in Moore v. Watson, 738 F. Supp. 2d 817, 830 (2010)).
41
Id.
42
See id. at 735. For example, in Hazelwood, students wrote about teen pregnancy and
parental divorce, which administrators deemed to be inappropriate for the immature
34
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refused to apply Hazelwood in higher education.43 Additionally,
some state legislatures have passed statutes resetting the Tinker
test as the appropriate test for determining whether
administrative regulation of student journalism is permissible.44
This jurisdictional split leaves open the question of how
much deference is due to college administrators in regulating
the content of students’ expression when their expression can
be interpreted to bear the imprimatur of the college. Looking to
other areas of First Amendment jurisprudence, there are
indications that the trend is toward granting more deference to
the government—including state colleges and universities—to
determine when regulation is required to serve the interests of
government programs.45 In the educational setting, this has led
to deference to administrators in determining regulations that
may only loosely be related to pedagogy.46 This trend includes
the recent adoption of the “professional standards” doctrine.47
II. PREVIOUS PROFESSIONAL STUDENT SPEECH EXCEPTIONS
Hints of the professional standards doctrine date back to
Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley,48 a 2011 case in which the Eleventh
Circuit determined that a university did not violate the First
Amendment by requiring a remediation plan for a counseling
graduate student who intended to impose her adverse views
about homosexuality on her clients.49 The Keeton court held that
high school audience. Id. at 740. The Court agreed that this rationale was a
legitimate pedagogical reason for prohibiting the students from publishing this
reporting. Id.
43
See Student Gov't Ass'n v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473, 480 n.6
(1st Cir. 1989); Hosty, 412 F.3d at 735; Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277,
1284–85 (10th Cir. 2004). For a discussion of how various courts have treated
Hazelwood in the college setting, see Frank LoMonte, The Key Word is Student:
Hazelwood Censorship Crashes the Ivy-Covered Gates, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 305
(2013).
44
See, e.g., Cal. Educ. Code § 76120 (Deering 2017); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 388.077
(West 2017); 16 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 16-109-3 (West 2017). Illinois, where Hosty
took place, passed one such law shortly after Hosty was decided. See 105 Ill. Comp.
Stat. Ann. 80 (2017). For a general discussion of such statutes, including a discussion
of how these laws may affect cases like Hazelwood, see Robert J. Schoop, States Talk
Back to the Supreme Court: “Students Should be Heard As Well As Seen,” 59 WEST’S
EDUC. L. REP. 579, 581 n.11 (1990). See also Tyler J. Buller, A State Response to
Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 66 ME. L. REV. 89, 149 (2013).
45
For further discussion of Hazelwood and the government speech doctrine, see MaryRose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of University Students, 101 MINN. L. REV.
1801, 1843–48 (2017).
46
Id. at 1837 (“The Court referred to universities as laboratories . . . that must be
given considerable deference.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
47
See discussion infra Section II.
48
664 F.3d. 865 (11th Cir. 2011).
49
Id. at 879. For an earlier predecessor to professional standards cases, see AxsonFlynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1290 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Thus, we will uphold the
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the clinical practicum program at issue was a nonpublic forum,
allowing school officials to “‘impose restrictions on speech that
are reasonable and viewpoint neutral.’” 50 Additionally, the
court imported the Hazelwood test to determine that the clinical
practicum program was a school-sponsored activity that bore
the imprimatur of the school, and thus found that the university
could regulate the student’s speech for the legitimate
pedagogical purpose of ensuring compliance with the American
Counseling Association (ACA) Code of Ethics.51
For the purposes of this discussion, the latter holding
bears special importance, as the Keeton court used a set of
professional standards external to the school or program rules
to find a legitimate pedagogical purpose in the university’s
actions.52 This type of analysis is also used in Ward v. Polite,53 a
2012 Sixth Circuit case that again dealt with a counseling
graduate student with religious objections to “‘affirm[ing]’ or
‘validat[ing]’ the ‘homosexual behavior’ of counseling
clients.”54 As part of the graduate program, all students had to
complete 40 hours counseling clients in a practicum program.55
When Ward asked that a homosexual client be reassigned to
another counselor, a university review committee concluded
that she had violated the ACA Code of Ethics and expelled her
from the program. 56 The Ward court, however, was
unconvinced that referrals violated ethical guidelines for
ATP’s decision to restrict (or compel) that speech as long as the ATP’s decision was
‘reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.’ We give ‘substantial
deference’ to ‘educators’ stated pedagogical concerns.’”). See also Watts v. Fla. Int’l
Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that a student working in a
social work clinic could be treated by the university as an employee rather than a
student for First Amendment purposes, and therefore the student could be
disciplined for speech as an employee on a matter of private concern).
50
Keeton, 664 F.3d at 872 (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460,
470 (2009)). It is unclear whether this determination would be valid today, given the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, in which the Court held
that content-based regulations need not be viewpoint-based in order to require strict
scrutiny: “Some facial distinctions based on a message are obvious, defining
regulated speech by particular subject matter, and others are more subtle, defining
regulated speech by its function or purpose. Both are distinctions drawn based on the
message a speaker conveys, and, therefore, are subject to strict scrutiny.” Reed v.
Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015).
51
Keeton, 664 F.3d. at 875–76.
52
See id. (holding that the University has a legitimate pedagogical concern in
teaching its students to follow the ACA Code of Ethics and the guidelines of the
American Psychological Association in order to produce ethical and effective
counselors).
53
667 F.3d. 727 (6th Cir. 2012).
54
Id. at 730.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 731–32.
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counselors, finding that they were in fact a common practice in
the field.57 Thus, the Sixth Circuit left for remand at the district
court level the question of whether an ethical policy against
referrals existed.58 However, the court indicated that, assuming
no such policy existed, the university’s expulsion of Ward
would not have been for a legitimate pedagogical purpose
under Hazelwood, and therefore would be violative of Ward’s
First Amendment rights.59
Both the Keeton and Ward courts applied Hazelwood,
holding that external ethical and professional guidelines could
create a legitimate pedagogical interest in regulating student
expression. In other words, the courts determined that the
expressive activity of the students in question (a) bore the
imprimatur of the schools, (b) did not take place in open
forums, and (c) instead took place as part of the curriculum.
The Ninth Circuit recently adopted a carve-out to the
First Amendment rights of professional students similar to that
created in Keeton and Ward in Oyama v. University of Hawaii,60
determining that universities may legally act against students
for their speech when such actions are “related directly to
defined and established professional standards, . . . narrowly
tailored to serve the University’s foundational core mission . . .
, and reflect[ive of] reasonable professional judgment.”61 Unlike
Keeton and Ward, the Oyama opinion did not rely heavily on
Hazelwood.
Mark Oyama was the picture of an unsympathetic
plaintiff. Unlike Keefe, who was dismissed for angsty Facebook
musings more befitting of a college student, 62 Oyama was
prevented from finishing his secondary education graduate
program for statements he had made on in-class assignments.63
Oyama’s offending statements included suggestions that age of
consent laws should be abolished and assertions that students
with special needs should not be included in mainstream
classrooms. 64 Program administrators denied Oyama their
approval to student teach, effectively removing him from the
57

Id. at 739.
Id. at 740–41. The parties settled before the lower court could decide these issues
on remand. See Ward v. Polite, ALL. DEFENDING FREEDOM,
https://www.adflegal.org/detailspages/case-details/ward-v.-polite (last visited Oct.
26, 2017).
59
Ward, 667 F.3d at 739–40.
60
813 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2015).
61
Id. at 860–61, 868.
62
Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523, 527–28 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1448
(2017).
63
Oyama, 813 F.3d at 856–57, 868.
64
Id.
58
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program, since student teaching was a requirement for
completion.65
In deciding that the university’s actions did not violate
Oyama’s First Amendment rights, the Ninth Circuit considered
the university’s argument that Oyama’s statements were “not in
alignment with standards set by the Hawaii Department of
Education, the National Council for the Accreditation of
Teachers (NCATE) and the Hawaii Teacher Standards Board
(HTSB).”66 The Court relied on public employee jurisprudence,
analogizing Oyama’s position as a potential student teacher to
that of a potential university employee. 67 Under the public
employee speech cases, the court said, “the University may
constitutionally evaluate or restrict the candidate’s speech to
fulfill its responsibilities to the public and to achieve its
institutional objectives.” 68 The Ninth Circuit also considered
what it referred to as “certification cases,” in which some courts
have deferred to universities’ certification decisions that are
“based on defined professional standards.”69
In discussing Hazelwood, the Ninth Circuit found that
Oyama’s speech implicated the imprimatur of the school
because, by certifying or denying Oyama certification for
student teaching, the school was forced to speak.70 “When the
University recommends a student for certification,” the Oyama
court said, “it communicates to the world that, in its view, that
student is fit to practice the profession; as a result, the
University places its "imprimatur" on each student it approves
to teach.”71 However, after discussing Hazelwood in this fashion,
the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the idea that Hazelwood and
other student speech jurisprudence could be properly applied in
a case dealing with college, rather than K-12, students. 72
Ultimately, the Oyama court relied upon employment and
certification cases to establish that universities may legally act
against students for their speech when such actions are “related
directly to defined and established professional standards, . . .
narrowly tailored to serve the University’s foundational mission
. . . , and reflect[ive of] reasonable professional judgment.”73
65

Id. at 857–58.
Id. at 857.
67
Id. at 860, 864–68.
68
Id. at 865.
69
Id. at 866–68. For further discussion of “certification cases,” see generally Emily
Gold Waldman, University Imprimaturs on Student Speech: The Certification Cases, 11
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 382 (2013).
70
Oyama, 813 F.3d at 862.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 862–63.
73
Id. at 860–61.
66

108

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

Under the university’s mandate from the state of
Hawaii, the university was to “ensure that education
professionals possess the appropriate training, preparation, and
competencies for teaching, to limit teacher licenses to
‘knowledgeable, effective, and caring professionals,’ and to
confirm that student teachers ‘[a]ct, speak, and dress’ like
teachers.”74 Thus, because Oyama did not “speak . . . like [a]
teacher[,]” denying him the opportunity to student teach was
within the responsibilities of the university.75 Although the idea
of preventing an individual who advocates for legalizing
consensual relationships between teachers and their minor
students from student teaching seems innocuous, even correct,
Oyama may present an example of the old adage that bad facts
make for bad law.
It is important to note that while the Oyama court did
not rely heavily on Hazelwood, the jurisprudence that the Oyama
court discussed in depth also invokes issues related to
government speech. 76 Like in the context of student speech
jurisprudence, government employee speech cases have
developed to view more and more employee speech as under
the government-employer’s reach. 77 For example, in the
Supreme Court’s most recent government employee speech
case, it determined that government employees speaking
outside their duties and as citizens on matters of public concern
could be subject to “only those speech restrictions that are
necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and
effectively.”78 Similarly, the certification cases upon which the
Oyama court relied borrow heavily from Hazelwood’s brand of
the government speech doctrine.79 Thus, while the Oyama court
did not specifically use Hazelwood, its decision can still be seen
as evidence of the continual expansion of the government
speech doctrine on campus. Just as in professional student
74

Id. at 869.
Id.
76
For example, the Oyama Court heavily discussed the “certification cases,” a group
of cases finding that “universities may consider students’ speech in making
certification decisions, so long as their decisions are based on defined professional
standards.” Id. at 867. For an in-depth discussion of these cases, see Waldman, supra
note 70. The Oyama Court also discussed public employee speech cases, id. at 864–
66, which require courts to weight “the interests of the [employee] . . . and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs,” Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
77
See generally Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of Off-Duty Government
Employees, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 2117 (2010) (arguing for a narrower presumption
that the non-work related speech of government employees should be protected
under the First Amendment).
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Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006).
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Oyama, 813 F.3d at 866–68.
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speech cases explicitly invoking Hazelwood, the Oyama court
found that the message of the university—and thus of the
state—was implicated in Oyama’s expression, and that the
university could therefore regulate his speech.80
Other courts have created First Amendment exceptions
for professional students while refusing to apply Hazelwood. In
2012, the Supreme Court of Minnesota broke legal ground in
2012 when it decided Tatro v. University of Minnesota,81 a case in
which the court applied a professional standards doctrine to a
university student’s Facebook post 82 —off-campus speech
traditionally considered in First Amendment jurisprudence to
be outside the regulatory reach of universities. 83 In Tatro, a
mortuary science student posted satirical comments about her
school experiences, sometimes referring to specific cadavers
using pseudonyms. 84 The university determined that Tatro’s
posts had violated the program rules, and thus changed Tatro’s
lab grade from a C+ to an F.85
Tatro sued, alleging that the school’s action violated her
First Amendment rights.86 The Tatro court explicitly refused to
apply the Hazelwood test, finding that Tatro’s speech could not
reasonably be perceived to bear the imprimatur of the school.87
However, in determining that the University of Minnesota had
not violated Tatro’s rights, it created a new “professional
standards” exception to First Amendment jurisprudence: “[A]
university does not violate the free speech rights of a student
enrolled in a professional program when the university imposes
sanctions for Facebook posts that violate academic program
rules that are narrowly tailored and directly related to
established professional conduct standards.”88

80

Id. at 862.
816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012).
82
Id. at 521.
83
See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404–05 (2007).
84
Tatro, 816 N.W.2d 509 at 511–13. Tatro’s Facebook comments included: “Gets to
play, I mean dissect, Bernie today. Let's see if I can have a lab void of reprimanding
and having my scalpel taken away. Perhaps if I just hide it in my sleeve . . . .” and
“Is looking forward to Monday's embalming therapy as well as a rumored
opportunity to aspirate. Give me room, lots of aggression to be taken out with a
trocar.” Id. at 112.
85
Id. at 513–14.
86
Id. at 511.
87
Id. at 518.
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Id. at 521.
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III. KEEFE V. ADAMS: FACTS & BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
As discussed in the introduction above, Craig Keefe
was dismissed from the Associate Degree Nursing Program at
Central Lakes College (CLC) after classmates complained
about Keefe’s use of social media. 89 Keefe had previously
become a licensed practical nurse after completing the practical
nursing program at CLC in June, 2011. 90 Keefe had been
dismissed from the Associate Degree program in December,
2011 for failing to maintain the requisite grades in his
coursework. 91 However, in the fall of 2012, he reapplied and
was readmitted to the program.92
Keefe’s real trouble began in late November, 2012, when
a classmate approached Keefe’s instructor to express concern
about posts Keefe had made on his Facebook page, which was
publicly available. 93 The classmate expressed concerns that
Keefe’s posts were threatening. 94 When a second classmate
complained to instructors about Keefe’s Facebook use, saying
that the posts “‘made her feel extremely uncomfortable and
nervous,’ and that ‘she didn’t feel she could function in the
same physical space with Craig [Keefe] at the clinical site,’” the
instructor separated Keefe from the complaining students and
forwarded the complaints to CLC’s Director of Nursing,
Connie Frisch.95
Frisch spoke to the Vice President of Academic Affairs,
Kelly McCalla, about the complaints, and was told to meet
with Keefe.96 When Frisch contacted Keefe to set up a meeting,
she would not tell Keefe the subject of the meeting. 97 Frisch
moved the meeting up a day after receiving word “that Keefe
had told someone there would be ‘hell to pay for whoever
complained about [him].’”98 At the meeting, Frisch and CLC’s
Dean of Students, Beth Adams, reviewed the steps of the
college’s Due Process Policy, and then explained to Keefe “his
Facebook posts raised concerns about his professionalism and
89

See Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523, 526 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1448
(2017).
90
Id.
91
Id.
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Id.
93
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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boundary issues.”99 While Frisch did not give Keefe a copy of
the concerning posts, she read to him the most concerning
posts.100
Among Keefe’s concerning posts were those quoted in
the introduction of this note: comments about needing whiskey
to control his anger, about frustration with group projects,
about needing anger management, about alleged sexism in the
program, and about difficulties Keefe was having getting
accommodations for medical reasons.101 Frisch expressed that
she was most concerned about Keefe’s post about giving a
classmate a hemopneumothorax. 102 After reviewing these
concerns, Frisch and Adams gave Keefe an opportunity to
explain himself.103 Keefe claimed that many of his posts were
jokes, that his Facebook account had been hacked, and that he
was unaware that the page was public.104 In a later deposition,
Keefe admitted to having authored all of the posts in question,
but maintained that they were jokes.105 Frisch was concerned by
Keefe’s apparent lack of remorse, and thus decided that he
could not proceed in the program.106 Instead, Keefe was told
that he could finish his semester’s coursework, and that the
credits would transfer to another program at CLC.107
Keefe’s removal from the Associate Degree Nursing
Program was based upon the program’s student handbook,
which Keefe had acknowledged reading, reviewing, and
understanding when he enrolled in the program. 108 The
handbook states that, “students enrolled in the Associate
Degree (AD) Nursing Program and Central Lakes College []
accept the moral and ethical responsibilities that have been
credited to the profession of nursing and are obligated to
uphold and adhere to the professional Code of Ethics.”109 The
handbook goes on to identify the American Nurses Association
Code for Nurses as the relevant code of ethics and explains,
99

Id.
Id.
101
Id. at 526–27; see also Keefe v. Adams, 44 F. Supp. 3d. 874, 878–79 (D. Minn.
2014), aff’d, 840 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied., 137 S. Ct. 1448 (2017).
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Keefe, 840 F.3d at 527. A “hemopneumothorax” occurs when both blood and air
accumulate in the chest cavity, as by puncture. Hemopneumothorax, MERRIAMWEBSTER MED. DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/medical/hemopneumothorax (last visited Oct. 26, 2017).
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Keefe, 840 F.3d at 527.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 527–28.
109
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“Central Lakes College has an obligation to graduate students
who will provide safe, competent nursing care and uphold the
moral and ethical principles of the profession of nursing.” 110
The handbook also states that “students who fail to meet the
moral, ethical, or professional behavioral standards . . . are not
eligible to progress in the nursing program.” 111 The ethical
standards identified by the handbook included avoidance of
“behavior unbecoming of the Nursing Profession.”112
The Nurses Association Code of Ethics referenced by
the Handbook included provisions requiring nurses to respect
“all individuals with whom the nurse interacts[,]” including
“preclud[ing] any and all forms of prejudicial actions, any form
of harassment or threatening behavior, or disregard for the
effect of one’s actions on others.”113 The Code also included a
provision on professional boundaries, which identified nursepatient and nurse-colleague relationships as different from
“personal and unstructured” relationships, as well as a
provision about wholeness of character, which required nurses
to “embrace[] the values of the profession.”114
Keefe appealed his removal from the Associate Degree
Nursing Program, and was instructed by Vice President
McCalla to abstain from contacting nursing faculty and
classmates. 115 Because of this instruction, Keefe stopped
attending and failed all of his classes.116 Keefe took down his
Facebook page as part of his appeal, and asked to be allowed to
finish the program, arguing that the “punishment [did not] fit
the crime.”117 McCalla notified Keefe in early January that his
appeal had been denied.118 When Keefe asked for a contested
case hearing to re-appeal his removal from the Program,
McCalla denied the request, citing that Keefe had been
removed for an academic program violation, and such hearings
were only available for students facing disciplinary actions.119
B. The District Court Decision
Keefe filed suit against CLC administrators, alleging
that his First Amendment and due process rights had been
110
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violated by his removal from the program.120 Although Keefe’s
due process claims provide interesting material and further
insight into Keefe’s case, this note will focus solely upon
Keefe’s First Amendment claim. At the District Court for the
District of Minnesota, Keefe argued that he was removed from
the program “in retaliation for his acts of speech in a context
that was unrelated to his school obligations and did not violate
any specific school rules.” 121 He further argued that his
statements did not impose material disruptions to the college,
and were not true threats.122
The District Court relied heavily on Tatro, as well as on
Keeton, in deciding that CLC had not violated Keefe’s First
Amendment rights.123 It cited Keeton in determining that Keefe’s
First Amendment rights had to be considered “in light of the
special characteristics of the school environment.” 124
Ultimately, the District Court imported the Tatro test: As in
Tatro, the District determined that because of the “‘special
characteristics of the school environment,’” 125 and because of
the program’s purpose to “instill[] in students the standards of
the nursing profession,” the college did not offend the First
Amendment in expelling Keefe.126 In coming to this conclusion,
the Keefe court cited the Minnesota Board of Nursing’s statutory
ability to “‘deny, revoke, suspend, limit, or condition the
license and registration of any person to practice professional,
advanced practice registered, or practical nursing’ for
‘[e]ngaging in unprofessional conduct.’”127
Also similar to Tatro, the district court did not use the
Hazelwood “legitimate pedagogical purpose” test to determine
that the administrative actions in question did not violate the
First Amendment, but instead employed external professional
standards as the measuring stick for the appropriateness of the
college’s actions. 128 In fact, the District Court did not cite
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Id. at 525.
Keefe v. Adams, 44 F. Supp. 3d 874, 887 (D. Minn. 2014), aff’d, 840 F.3d 523 (8th
Cir. 2016), cert. denied., 137 S. Ct. 1448 (2017).
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Id. at 887–88.
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Id. at 888 (quoting Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 871 (11th Cir.
2011)).
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Id. at 888–89.
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Id. at 888 (citing Minn. Stat. § 148.261, subd. 1(6) (2012)). Notably,
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Hazelwood at all.129 Keefe once again appealed, this time to the
Eighth Circuit.130
IV. MISAPPLICATION OF HAZELWOOD: PROFESSIONAL
STUDENT SPEECH AS GOVERNMENT/SCHOOL-SPONSORED
SPEECH
The Eighth Circuit diverged from the district court in its
application of Hazelwood. While the district court had not
considered Hazelwood in coming to its decision and instead had
relied on cases such as Keeton and Tatro, the Eighth Circuit
pulled heavily from Hazelwood in affirming the lower court and
upholding Keefe’s removal from the program. 131 In applying
Hazelwood in Keefe, the Eighth Circuit found that although the
Hazelwood case considered school-sponsored student speech,
“the concept has broader relevance to student speech [because]
. . . speech reflecting non-compliance with [the] Code that is
related to academic activities ‘materially disrupts’ the
Program’s ‘legitimate pedagogical concerns.’” 132 Thus, the
court decided, Hazelwood and even the Tinker “material
disruption” standard could apply to Keefe’s case, even though
Keefe’s speech was made off-campus and not during a
curricular activity.133
The Hazelwood Court recognized that “[a] school need
not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic
educational mission,' . . . even though the government could
not censor similar speech outside the school.” 134 The Court
considered that a school must be able to manage its own name,
and thus must be able to regulate student speech that invokes
the school’s name in order to ensure “that the views of the
individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the
school.” 135 Thus, schools may regulate in-school speech that
bears the school’s imprimatur without violating students’
constitutional rights, as long as the regulation is related to a
“legitimate pedagogical concern.”136

129
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133
Id.
134
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (citing Bethel Sch.
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In some ways, the concerns of the Hazelwood court can
be seen to mirror the concerns of the Court in government
speech cases: 137 When the government speaks, or appears to
speak, it need not be content-neutral, and it must be allowed
wide latitude to determine its own message. 138 In Hazelwood,
this philosophy is applied to allow schools that same latitude in
determining its message when students appear to speak on
behalf of their schools in curricular activities. Like in the recent
government speech Supreme Court case Walker v. Tex. Div.,
Sons of Confederate Veterans,139 the Hazelwood court relied, in part,
on the reasonable person test to determine when a school’s
imprimatur is present.140
Professional student speech cases such as Keefe, Keeton,
and Ward—and even those cases such as Oyama and Tatro, in
which Hazelwood was not applied—threaten to extend the
Hazelwood doctrine, and thus the government speech doctrine,
beyond its logical bounds. Scholars have expressed concern that
the government speech doctrine is quickly expanding and
threatens to swallow the First Amendment, 141 and the
professional student speech doctrine is further evidence of this
expansion.
Keefe, especially, demonstrates this propensity of the
professional student speech doctrine to allow public colleges
and universities to expand the reach of their imprimatur, and
thus to expand their ability to regulate messages. While it is
easier to see how the speech of Keeton and Ward may have
been seen as bearing their schools’ imprimaturs—since those
students were speaking in the context of clinical practicum
programs created and maintained by their universities—the
case for an imprimatur is more strained in the context of cases
such as Keefe, in which students speak on their individual social
137

See, e.g., Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239,
2253 (2015) (holding that specialty license plates constitute government speech and
therefore decisions about specialty license plate designs need not be made in a
content-neutral fashion).
138
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (stating that when the government is
advancing certain permissible goals, necessary discouragement of alternative goals is
not unconstitutional).
139
135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
140
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271 (explaining that while the Tinker test applies to
individual student speech, the Hazelwood test applies when “students, parents, and
members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
school”); see also Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2251 (holding that license plates are
government speech, partially because reasonable observers would interpret them as
such).
141
See, e.g., Mary Rose Papandrea, The Government Brand, 110 NW. L. REV. 1195,
1198 (2016) (“[T]he Court's new approach to the government speech doctrine
threatens the future of free speech rights in this country.”).
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media platforms that few would “erroneously attribute[] to the
school.”142
Yet, the Keefe court was readily willing to read the
college’s imprimatur onto Keefe’s speech—even though the
speech took place on a personal social media page—because
“the conferral of a degree places the school's imprimatur upon
the student as qualified to pursue his chosen profession.”143 But
this reasoning leads to the absurdity that anything a student ever
says bears the imprimatur of that student’s school—and thus
can be seen as the school (government) speaking—because the
school has placed its endorsement upon the student by
admitting him and ultimately by granting him a degree.
This absurdity of reading the school’s imprimatur on to
off-campus social media speech simply because the school has
admitted and likely will grant the student a degree matches the
absurdity of reading the government’s imprimatur on specialty
license plates, as the Supreme Court did in Walker. There, the
Court reasoned that a reasonable person would believe
specialty license plates to be government speech because license
plates are distributed by the government and have historically
been controlled by the government.144 As Justice Alito argued
in his dissent in Walker, it is irrational to believe that a
reasonable person would believe that a “Rather Be Golfing”
plate means Texas’s official policy is that it is “better to golf
than to work.”145 But it is even more difficult to believe that a
reasonable person would assume Central Lakes College
endorsed Keefe’s posts about whiskey and anger management,
or about hemopneumothoraxes and pencil sharpeners, even if
the college would confer a degree on Keefe. Even more absurd
is the proposition that schools place their imprimaturs on all
142

Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271. The Keefe court concluded that Keefe’s posts were
related to the classroom because “the posts were directed at classmates, involved
their conduct in the Nursing Program, and included a physical threat related to their
medical studies” and also because of the “potential to impact patient care” by
preventing effective communication between nursing students. Keefe v. Adams, 840
F.3d 523, 532 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1448 (2017). See also id. at 532–
33 (determining that Keefe still diverges from Oyama, Keeton, and Ward, which all
involved speech that occurred during normal classroom or clinical activities and that
the connection between Keefe’s speech and curriculum, while arguably present, is
more attenuated than in other cases).
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Keefe, 840 F.3d at 533 (citing Doherty v. S. Coll. of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570,
476 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810 (1989)).
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(2015).
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Id. at 2255 (Alito, J. dissenting); see also Papandrea, supra note 46, at 1847 (arguing
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who does not understand the government's obligations under the public forum
doctrine might erroneously assume that the government endorses any speech that
appears on its property”).
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students—and on the whole of each student—as inherently
qualified professionals, which is the position of the Eighth
Circuit in Keefe.146 As Justice O’Connor once wisely said, “The
proposition that schools do not endorse everything they fail to
censor is not complicated.”147
Regardless of questions of imprimatur, free speech
advocates worry that the professional student speech exception
that is growing out of cases such as Keefe and Oyama could have
far-reaching effects on college students’ rights to expression.148
First Amendment attorney Will Creeley noted that this
standard could end in some extreme results.149 He explained,
for example, if the University of Minnesota School of Law were
to adopt the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct
(MPRC), this would include the MPRC rule “that attorneys
maintain ‘a professional, courteous, and civil attitude toward
all persons involved in the legal system.’”150 This could have the
outlandish result of law students being dismissed for speaking
rudely to a classmate, when “most speech that is not ‘civil’ or
‘courteous’ still enjoys constitutional protection.”151
Oyama additionally provides an example of how the
professional student speech doctrine validates viewpoint
discrimination, which, according to the Supreme Court in Reed
v. Town of Gilbert, 152 regulates “speech based on ‘the specific
motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the
speaker’” and “is a ‘more blatant’ and ‘egregious form of
content discrimination.’” 153 Viewpoint discrimination occurs
when a person is punished for expression because of the
viewpoint espoused rather than because of the general type of
speech, the manner of expression, or some other reason. 154
Oyama was punished not because he dared speak about policy
matters, but because he expressed policy viewpoints with which
the University of Hawaii administrators took issue. This use of
146
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viewpoint discrimination makes sense based on the professional
student speech exception’s roots in the Hazelwood doctrine:
under Hazelwood, scholars have argued, viewpoint
discrimination is arguably explicitly allowed.155
Again, while Oyama’s views are far from sympathetic, it
is important to remember that he never acted on his views, and
the university did not indicate that there was any reason to
believe Oyama was planning to act in an inappropriate way in
the classroom. For example, while Oyama may have believed
that age of consent laws should be repealed, there was no
indication that he planned to engage in inappropriate
relationships with students. To the contrary, Oyama had told
his professors that he would comply with the law and report
such conduct, even while believing the law was incorrect.
It seems clear, then, that Oyama was punished for
holding unpopular viewpoints. While Oyama’s viewpoints
provide somewhat of an extreme case, it would not be
inconceivable for the professional student speech exception to
extend to discipline for viewpoints that are not so out of the
norm—could a student teacher who espouses the view “all lives
matter” in class assignments be kept from the classroom for not
sympathizing with marginalized students, or could a
transgendered student teacher be kept from student teaching
because she does not “dress like a teacher”?
V. ENCOURAGING PROFESSIONALISM WITHOUT TRAMPLING
FREE SPEECH
Oyama appealed his case to the Supreme Court, which
denied his petition, holding true to a pattern of abstaining from
issuing guidance regarding college student speech issues. 156
Without guidance from the highest court, lower courts will
continue to struggle to find a balance between allowing
155
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Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
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universities to instill professional standards and allowing
students broad free expression rights.
It is possible to protect both students’ rights and
professional standards. For example, the First Circuit got it
right when, in Hennessy v. City of Melrose, 157 it found that a
student teacher’s First Amendment rights had not been violated
when he received a failing grade on his student teaching
assignment because of outbursts of religious opinions during
class and class-related activities. 158 In that case, the student
teacher had not only expressed opinions that classrooms should
be closer conformed to biblical ideals, but also actually acted
upon those opinions by interrupting normal classroom activities
to proselytize to students and express frustration with the
classroom model. 159 Disciplining professional students for
unprofessional conduct—as was the case in Hennessy—rather
than unprofessional speech—as was the case in Oyama—serves
to balance both free expression and professionalism concerns.
For example, if Oyama were to ever abstain from reporting an
inappropriate relationship between a teacher and student or
were to act in a discriminatory manner toward students with
disabilities, he could also be punished without violating the
constitution. These guidelines would follow with precedent that
holds that while the First Amendment protects speech, it does
not protect conduct.160
Additionally, professional students should continue to
be held to the same free speech exceptions as the public,
including restrictions on true threats. For example, if the Keefe
court felt that Keefe’s comments constituted threats to the
physical safety of his fellow classmates, it could have upheld
Keefe’s suspension on the grounds that his speech was not
protected—for professional students or for anyone.
While imperfect for the higher education setting, in
which students are adults capable of withstanding more
distractions than their younger counterparts, the Tinker
standard may provide a workable avenue for public college
157
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the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
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officials to discipline professional students for speech that
disrupts the learning process. For example, in Keefe, if the
college were to have shown that Keefe’s comments were
making it difficult for students to complete group projects with
Keefe or otherwise disrupting the classroom, Tinker may have
provided a means of legitimately dismissing Keefe for the sake
of maintaining order and education in the classroom.

